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A nimals that live in large, stable social groups face substantial cognitive demands. They must recognize 
other individuals in their group, continuously track the 
position, social behavior and foraging success of other in-
dividuals, classify group members by age, sex, genetic re-
lationship, reproductive status and dominance rank, and 
update this information as circumstances change (Cheney 
& Seyfarth 1990). Given these demands, it has been hy-
pothesized that highly social animals should show com-
mensurate increases in cognitive abilities related to social 
living (Kummer et al. 1997). Indeed, social complexity 
may have provided the primary selective impetus for the 
evolution of intelligence in primates (Jolly 1966; Hum-
phrey 1976; Byrne & Whiten 1988). 
The primary literature addressing this hypothesis 
has focused on data from field studies of Old World pri-
mates, constructing evolutionary accounts of the func-
tional significance of their cognitive abilities (reviewed 
in Byrne & Whiten 1997). But these studies provide little 
in the way of direct tests of the evolutionary hypothesis, 
largely because comparable data from species differing 
in sociality are difficult to obtain with field methodolo-
gies. There have also been very extensive experimen-
tal studies on the cognitive capabilities of animals (re-
viewed in Shettleworth 1998). But for the most part, the 
tasks used have not been designed with regard to the 
cognitive demands of social complexity, and the species 
studied have not been selected with sociality in mind. 
As a result, the social complexity hypothesis remains 
relatively untested.
One promising approach to testing the social com-
plexity hypothesis is to use controlled experimental tech-
niques to compare cognitive abilities in closely related 
species that differ strongly in their social organization 
(Endler 1986; Kamil 1988). These need not be primates: 
if the hypothesis is correct, enhanced cognitive abilities 
should be apparent in any highly social vertebrate (Balda 
et al. 1996; Holekamp et al. 1999). In this paper, we pres-
ent the first explicit comparative test of the social com-
plexity hypothesis conducted under well-controlled, ex-
perimental conditions, using two closely related species 
of birds with contrasting degrees of sociality. 
Pinyon jays, Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus, are probably 
the most highly social North American corvids, living 
in stable groups of 50–500 individuals, foraging as a per-
manent flock and breeding colonially (Marzluff & Balda 
1992). In contrast, the typical social unit of closely related 
western scrub-jays, Aphelocoma californica, is a pair of 
birds and their young of the year (Madge & Burn 1994). 
Although pinyon jays are more dependent on stored food 
during winter, the two species are quite comparable in 
most other aspects of their biology. They are sympatric 
over large parts of Arizona and Colorado, U.S.A., using 
similar resources (Madge & Burn 1994), and Aphelocoma 
and Gymnorhinus appear to be the most closely related of 
the six corvid genera endemic to the New World (Monte-
ros & Cracraft 1997).
The social complexity hypothesis predicts that despite 
the close degree of relatedness and substantial ecological 
similarities between these species, the differing demands 
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Abstract
The social complexity hypothesis asserts that animals living in large social groups should display enhanced cognitive abili-
ties along predictable dimensions. To test this concept, we compared highly social pinyon jays, Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus, 
with relatively nonsocial western scrub-jays, Aphelocoma californica, on two complex cognitive tasks relevant to the ability to 
track and assess social relationships. Pinyon jays learned to track multiple dyadic relationships more rapidly and more accu-
rately than scrub-jays and appeared to display a more robust and accurate mechanism of transitive inference. These results 
provide a clear demonstration of the association between social complexity and cognition in animals.
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of their social lifestyles should have selected for differ-
ences in relevant cognitive abilities. To test this hypoth-
esis, we explored a subset of the cognitive abilities that 
social animals presumably use to track and assess rela-
tionships among group members. Understanding the 
web of relationships within the group should, in the first 
instance, require simultaneous tracking of a large number 
of dyadic interactions. We would thus expect highly so-
cial animals to learn multiple dyadic relationships more 
readily and be able to keep track of more of them. This 
aspect of social cognition was tested in experiment 1. 
Second, it seems unlikely that an individual in a large 
social group could ever observe interactions between all 
possible pairs of group members. Social animals must 
base some of their relationship judgments on transitive 
inferences, concluding that if A is dominant to B and B is 
dominant to C, then A would probably also dominate C, 
even if they have never seen A and C interact (Smith 1988; 
Hogue et al. 1996). This suggests that social and nonsocial 
species should differ in their ability to make transitive in-
ferences. This aspect of social cognition was tested in ex-
periment 2.
We tested scrub-jays and pinyon jays using well-estab-
lished operant procedures, in which the ordering of a set 
of arbitrary stimuli can be inferred from a series of dyadic 
comparisons (Fersen et al. 1991; Treichler & van Tilburg 
1996). In the first experiment, the birds were trained on 
a series of discriminations between successive pairs of 
seven colored stimuli, simultaneously tracking six dyadic 
relationships. Species differences were assessed in terms 
of the rate of task acquisition and asymptotic levels of 
performance. In the second experiment, we tested both 
species with novel stimulus pairs to analyze their transi-
tive reasoning abilities.
General Methods
Subjects
Five scrub-jays and five pinyon jays were captured as 
adults in live traps in Colorado and northern Arizona 
and were subsequently housed in individual cages in en-
vironmentally controlled rooms (22°C; 14:10 h light:dark 
cycle). They were maintained at 85–90% of their free-feed-
ing weights by controlled feedings of turkey starter, sun-
flower seeds, parrot pellets, mealworms, pine nuts and a 
vitamin supplement, and were given unlimited access to 
grit and water. All subjects were initially naïve to operant 
procedures but had previously been used in several dif-
ferent open-room tests of spatial orientation.
Apparatus
Experiments were conducted in operant boxes equipped 
with three 2.5-cm diameter pecking keys spaced at 7.6-
cm intervals across the front wall of the chamber, 22.5 cm 
above the floor. A perch was placed in front of the key 
array and adjusted so that the centers of the keys were 
approximately at eye level for each species. During tri-
als, colored light from a computer monitor was projected 
on the keys from behind through diffusion filters. The 
stimulus colors were red, green, blue, magenta, yellow, 
cyan, orange, or white, drawn from the standard VGA 
palette and chosen to be maximally discriminable to the 
human eye. The chamber was diffusely lit, and ambient 
white noise was provided to mask external sounds. Re-
wards were the most preferred food items for each spe-
cies, pieces of pine nut for pinyon jays and halves of 
mealworm for scrub-jays. These were delivered into a 
food cup centered at floor level at the rear of the chamber, 
turning on an adjacent ‘food light.’
Trial Sequence
At the start of each trial, the center key was illuminated in 
white. If the key was not pecked within 15 seconds, it was 
turned off, and the trial was reinitiated after a 3-second 
delay. When the center key was pecked, it was turned off, 
and both side keys were illuminated, presenting a choice 
between two of the seven nonwhite colors. Upon three 
successive pecks to one of the side keys, the entire panel 
was darkened. If the correct key had been pecked, a re-
ward was delivered. After 10 seconds, the food light was 
turned off, and another trial began 20 seconds later. If the 
wrong key was pecked, the next trial was presented af-
ter a 30-s delay. If the bird failed to peck either key three 
times within 60 seconds, the panel was darkened, and the 
trial was repeated after a 30-second delay.
Initial Training
The birds were first habituated to the chamber and then 
shaped to peck the side keys when either was illuminated 
in white. They were subsequently given 6 days of experi-
ence pecking the side keys for reward, 36 trials per day, 
18 to each side in random order. The central white key 
was then added for 6 days as an automatic precursor, and 
the response requirement for the side keys was increased 
to three pecks. After 6 days at this stage, responses to the 
initial white key were made obligatory, and the birds 
were transferred to experiment 1, which tested their abil-
ity to learn a set of dyadic relationships that defined an 
implicit ordinal sequence.
Experiment 1
The ability to track dyadic relationships was assessed by 
training each bird on a series of discriminations between 
successive pairs of seven implicitly ordered colors. The 
correct choice was defined by the particular pair of col-
ors presented: choosing B was rewarded when B was pre-
sented with C, but not when B was presented with A. This 
contextual aspect of the task was introduced gradually, 
but all six pairs were ultimately fully intermixed within 
sessions, requiring simultaneous tracking of six dyadic 
relationships.
Methods
The seven nonwhite stimuli were assigned a unique order-
ing for each bird that was balanced across birds within spe-
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cies, ensuring that no adjacent pairing occurred more than 
once and no stimulus occurred more than twice in the same 
ordinal position. The design thus ensured that the relative 
discriminabilities of the stimulus pairs could not confound 
the main effects of stimulus order either between or within 
species. For any given color pair, only responses to the 
first, higher-ranked color were rewarded, so the series of 
paired discriminations defined an implicit hierarchy: A > B 
> C > D > E > F > G. Birds were given daily sessions of 36 
trials, with the position of the correct stimulus randomized 
between left and right keys on each trial.
In the first phase, all trials in a session consisted of a 
single color pair. Thus, subjects were trained first on pair 
A/B, then on B/C, then on C/D. When a bird reached a 
criterion of 32 or more correct responses in each of three 
successive sessions, it was advanced to the next pair. As 
each bird completed the last pair (F/G), it was advanced 
to the second phase, an equal mixture of two adjacent 
color pairs (e.g. B/C and C/D).
While the first phase was essentially a partial reversal 
task, the second phase entailed greater cognitive com-
plexity, in that one of the three stimuli was present in 
every trial, but whether responses to it were rewarded 
depended on which other choice stimulus was present. 
For example, when B/C and C/D were being presented, 
C was correct when paired with D, but incorrect when 
paired with B. When each subject reached criterion on a 
set of three successive stimuli, testing with the next set 
began. For example, criterial performance during a B/C 
and C/D session would be followed the next day with a 
session of C/D and D/E trials.
In the third phase, the birds were required to track all six 
color pairs presented in equal numbers and in randomized 
order each day. This task was continued for 100 sessions 
for the pinyon jays. Because the scrub-jays did not appear 
to reach asymptotic performance levels within 100 sessions, 
they were given an additional 100 training sessions.
Results
Although the two species learned the first (A/B) pairing 
at comparable rates (paired Student’s t test: t4.8 = _1.12, 
NS), repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
on the results of the first phase of acquisition (Figure 1) 
indicated that pinyon jays learned the remaining dyads 
significantly faster than scrub-jays. The main effect of spe-
cies was significant (ANOVA: F1,8 = 8.79, P < 0.02), as was 
the effect of color pair (ANOVA: F5,40 = 5.05, P < 0.002), 
presumably reflecting the greater error rates displayed 
to the C/D and E/F pairs, but the species-by-pair inter-
action was not significant. During the second acquisition 
phase, pinyon jays again required much less experience 
than scrub-jays to reach criterion (Figure 2). Pinyon jays 
averaged 266 trials to criterion per triad, while scrub-jays 
needed 684 trials per triad to attain the same performance 
level. Repeated measures ANOVA on the results of the 
second phase showed a significant main effect of species 
(ANOVA: F1,8 = 13.18, P < 0.01), but no significant effect 
of triad and no significant interaction. 
At the beginning of the third phase, accuracy was com-
parable for the two species, and well above chance levels 
(Figure 3). However, pinyon jays improved more rapidly 
than scrub-jays and attained a higher asymptotic level of 
performance. Repeated measures ANOVA on data from 
the first 100 sessions, grouped into blocks of four con-
secutive days, showed a significant main effect of species 
(ANOVA: F1,8 = 27.53, P < 0.001) and block (ANOVA: 
F25,193 = 12.28, P < 0.0001), as well as a significant species 
× block interaction (ANOVA: F25,193 = 3.56, P < 0.0001). 
Asymptotic levels of performance still differed between 
species, even after the scrub-jays had been given 100 ses-
sions of additional training (paired Student’s t test: t7 = 
3.74, P < 0.008). 
Discussion
The two species differed strikingly in their performance on 
this implicit ranking task, indicating a consistent species 
Figure 1. Acquisition of discriminative performance on single color 
pairs. Data points indicate mean errors to criterial performance across 
birds. Error bars bracket the pooled within-subjects standard error esti-
mate for each species. ●: Pinyon jays; ▲: scrub-jays. 
Figure 2. Acquisition of discriminative performance on mixtures of two 
successive color pairs. Data points indicate mean errors to criterial per-
formance across birds. Error bars bracket the pooled within-subjects 
standard error estimate for each species. ●: Pinyon jays; ▲: scrub-jays. 
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difference in cognitive ability. Pinyon jays learned the dy-
adic relationships more rapidly, with fewer errors, and 
reached a higher asymptotic level of performance than 
scrub-jays. Moreover, the pattern of errors during acqui-
sition clearly differed between the species. In the first 
phase (Figure 1), learning the initial A/B pair was an ac-
quisition problem, which the two species solved equally 
well. Subsequent pairings involved a partial reversal, in 
that the rewarded item was previously incorrect, and pin-
yon jay error rates were significantly lower, particularly 
for the C/D and E/F combinations. This pattern suggests 
that pinyon jays adapt more readily to reversals of previ-
ous reward outcomes.
A similar effect was apparent during the second phase, 
learning pairs of dyads (Figure 2). The conspicuous peak in 
errors to criterion for scrub-jays on the C/D, D/E treatment 
was wholly absent for pinyon jays. Training on the C/D, 
D/E triad, unlike earlier stages of this phase, involved si-
multaneous reversals or partial reversals for all three choice 
stimuli. This again suggests that interference from prior re-
ward history was more problematic for scrub-jays.
When the task was expanded to include all six color 
pairs in every session (Figure 3), both species began at 
a similar level, well above chance. But while the pinyon 
jays rapidly improved, the scrub-jays had a great deal of 
difficulty responding accurately when all six dyads were 
presented in each session. While pinyon jays reached 80% 
correct on all pairs in an average of 68 sessions, only four 
of five scrub-jays managed to reach 75% correct even after 
200 sessions. It is unlikely that these differences were due 
to some methodological detail that favored the pinyon 
jays, as there were no initial species differences in any of 
the three training phases. In an earlier operant study of 
color non-matching-to-sample (Olson et al. 1995), scrub-
jays took longer to learn the task than pinyon jays, but 
they ultimately reached similar asymptotic levels of per-
formance. Although methodological differences make 
comparisons to other studies difficult, the acquisition 
performance of scrub-jays on the implicit sequence task 
appeared to be significantly better than that of pigeons, 
Columba livia (Fersen et al. 1991), while that of pinyon jays 
was similar to but somewhat slower than that of rhesus 
macaques, Macaca mulatta (Treichler & van Tilburg 1996).
Experiment 2
In this experiment, we tested for transitive inference by 
presenting occasional probe trials of novel, nonadjacent 
color pairs intermixed among familiar stimulus combi-
nations. Although the birds had had previous experi-
ence with both B and D, for example, these stimuli had 
never been presented as alternative choices on the same 
trial. A consistent choice of B in this novel pairing would, 
therefore, indicate a transitive inference from the implicit 
ordinal sequence. A frequently cited indication of suc-
cessful transitive reasoning is the symbolic distance ef-
fect (Moyer & Bayer 1976), an increase in the accuracy of 
transitive choices as the distance between items along the 
implicit sequence increases (i.e. B/E is responded to more 
accurately than B/D; Bryant & Trabasso 1971; Fersen et 
al. 1991; Steirn et al. 1995).
The literature suggests that transitive responding dur-
ing testing with novel pairs may differ depending on how 
the implicit ordinal sequence is represented in memory. In 
an ‘associative’ (Terrace & McGonigle 1994) representation, 
the animal chooses between stimuli based on their relative 
associative strength. Associative strength accrues gradu-
ally during training, over many trials, through direct or 
indirect association with reward. Several algebraic models 
of this cognitive mechanism have been proposed (Fersen 
et al. 1991; Delius & Siemann 1998; Zentall & Sherburne 
1998). The models differ substantially in detail, but when 
we evaluated each of them across a range of potential pa-
rameter values, we found that they generally produced 
higher associative strength at the beginning of an implicit 
sequence and greater variance in strength at the end.
This implies that using an associative representational 
system will yield transitive responding, but that error 
rates will be higher at the end of the implicit sequence. 
Associative representation, thus, should be characterized 
by a ‘first-item accuracy effect’ (Fersen et al. 1991), a de-
cline in performance as a function of the position in the 
implicit sequence of the higher-ranked member of a dyad 
(i.e. B/C is responded to more accurately than C/D or D/
E). Such first-item effects have been found in a number 
of studies with pigeons, which appear to form associa-
tive representations of sequentially presented color dyads 
(Fersen et al. 1991; Steirn et al. 1995; Wynne 1997; Delius 
& Siemann 1998).
In a ‘relational’ (D’Amato 1991) or ‘linear’ (D’Amato & 
Columbo 1990) representation, in contrast, the animal in-
terprets the outcomes of individual stimulus pairings as 
reflections of an underlying linear or spatial array and as-
sociates particular stimuli directly with their ordinal posi-
tions in the array. Animals using this system should show 
Figure 3. Acquisition of discriminative performance on mixtures of 
six successive color pairs. Each data point indicates the mean accuracy 
across birds for a contiguous block of four 36-trial sessions. Error bars 
bracket the pooled within-subjects standard error estimate for each 
species. Circles are data from pinyon jays; triangles are data from scrub-
jays. Filled symbols plot progress over the initial 100 sessions of training; 
open symbols indicate performance after the scrub-jays had been given 
an additional 100 training sessions. 
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minimal first-item accuracy effects. However, if determin-
ing relative position involves counting down from the top 
of the sequence, relational representations will produce 
longer choice latencies for items late in the list, a first-item 
effect on response times. Such latency effects have been 
reported in both humans and capuchin monkeys, Cebus 
apella (D’Amato & Columbo 1988, 1990; D’Amato 1991). 
Distinguishing between these two representational sys-
tems was the primary focus of experiment 2.
Methods
The same subjects, apparatus and trial contingencies were 
used as in experiment 1, with the exception of the inclu-
sion of probe trials of nonadjacent pairs. For transitive in-
ference testing, the birds were given 40 daily sessions of 
36 trials each. During each session, they were presented 
with familiar, adjacent pairs on 33 trials and novel, non-
adjacent pairs on three probe trials. The 120 probe trials 
presented to each bird included 20 of each of the central, 
nonadjacent pairs in the implicit sequence (B/D, B/E, B/
F, C/E, C/F and D/F). We did not test pairs including A 
or G, because responses to A had always been rewarded 
and those to G never rewarded during training (the ‘end-
anchor effect’: Bryant & Trabasso 1971). To avoid biasing 
choice on subsequent presentations, all choices during 
probe trials were rewarded (Steirn et al. 1995). Otherwise, 
the same reinforcement contingencies were used. All of 
the pinyon jays completed the transitive inference tests, 
but one of the scrub-jays had to be removed from the ex-
periment for health reasons. 
Results
Both species showed significantly higher accuracy on non-
adjacent probe trials than expected by chance. For pinyon 
jays, the proportion of correct choices on transitive infer-
ence trials was 0.86 (paired Student’s t test: t4 = 17.27, P < 
0.001); for scrub-jays, it was 0.77 (t3 = 3.98, P < 0.03). The 
species difference was not significant (t7 = 1.45, NS).
Analysis of the symbolic distance effect also indicated 
that pinyon jays and scrub-jays were equally capable of 
making transitive inferences. Because longer symbolic 
distances are inevitably associated with higher-ranking 
first items in a linear array, symbolic distance is fully con-
founded with first-item effects when all possible pairs are 
included in the analysis (as in Fersen et al. 1991). To avoid 
such problems in interpretation, we analyzed for sym-
bolic distance effects separately in stimulus pairs involv-
ing the second-ranked item (B/C, B/D, B/E and B/F) and 
in those involving the third-ranked item (C/D, C/E and 
C/F).
Repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of symbolic distance in scrub-jays (ANOVA: 
F3,9 = 4.05, P < 0.05) but not in pinyon jays (ANOVA: F3,12 
= 1.38, NS) for pairs involving the second-ranked item 
(Figure 4a). The pinyon jays may simply have reached a 
performance ceiling, as two of them made no errors for 
any nonadjacent stimulus pairs in this data set. The results 
for pairs involving the third-ranked item showed a similar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tendency (Figure 4b), but the effect was not significant in 
either species (ANOVA: pinyon jays: F2,8 = 1.50; scrub-
jays: F2,6 = 0.97, both NS), owing to both higher variance 
and fewer degrees of freedom for this comparison.
In contrast, the position of stimuli in the implicit se-
quence had substantially different effects in the two spe-
cies, differences that were evident in performance on 
trials with both familiar, adjacent pairs and novel, nonad-
jacent pairs. Our analysis of first-item effects in adjacent 
stimulus pairs, excluding the terminal dyads, compared 
pairs B/C, C/D, D/E and E/F. Analysis of nonadjacent 
pairs used dyads that were two steps apart on the im-
plicit ranking scale (B/D, C/E and D/F). As there were 
large between-species differences in variance, these and 
subsequent analyses were carried out separately within 
each species.
For adjacent stimulus pairs (Figure 5a), there was a 
strong, significant first-item effect on choice accuracy in 
scrub-jays (ANOVA: F3,9 = 8.64, P < 0.006), but not in pin-
yon jays (ANOVA: F3,12 < 1, NS). In the most extreme case, 
a scrub-jay that showed 92% accuracy in responding to 
B/C dropped to well below chance (37%) for E/F. Pinyon 
jay performance, in contrast, was almost invariably above 
70% correct for all individuals and all stimulus pairs. Ac-
curacy analysis for nonadjacent probe trials yielded a 
similar pattern. Response accuracy declined across first-
item rankings for scrub-jays (Figure 5b; ANOVA: F2,6 = 
4.97, P = 0.05), but not for pinyon jays (ANOVA: F2,8 = 
2.17, NS). (The apparent decline in performance for pin-
yon jays (Figure 5b) was the result of a single subject that 
had anomalously low accuracies in responding to D/F 
probes.) 
We then analyzed the effects of sequential position on 
response time to adjacent color pairs (Figure 6a). Both 
Figure 4. Performance accuracy of pinyon jays (●) and scrub-jays (▲) 
during transitive inference testing, analyzed for symbolic distance effects. 
(a) Mean accuracy across subjects within species is plotted for color 
pairs at successively greater distances on the implicit sequence, using 
only stimulus pairs that included the second-ranked item. (b) Mean ac-
curacy across subjects is plotted for stimulus pairs including the third-
ranked item. In each case, error bars bracket the pooled within-subjects 
standard error estimate for each species. 
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species responded more slowly to adjacent pairs near the 
end of the sequence (ANOVA: pinyon jays: F3,12 = 6.91, P 
< 0.006; scrub-jays: F3,9 = 5.35, P < 0.025). But the mean re-
sponse time for pinyon jays was significantly longer than 
that for scrub-jays for the last two dyads (D/E and E/F; 
paired Student’s t test: t7_2.86, P < 0.03). The same pattern 
was observed during nonadjacent probe trials (Figure 6b), 
where response time increased as a function of sequential 
position for pinyon jays (ANOVA: F2,8 = 17.15, P < 0.002), 
but not for scrub-jays (F2,6 = 1.71, NS).
Discussion
Both scrub-jays and pinyon jays showed high accuracy in 
novel, nonadjacent probe trials, demonstrating an ability 
to make transitive inferences. There were, however, strik-
ing differences in their patterns of responding as a func-
tion of the position of the stimulus pair in the implicit 
ordinal sequence. Pinyon jays showed no effect of posi-
tion of the highest-ranked stimulus in the pair on choice 
accuracy, but were slower in responding to pairs that 
were lower in the sequence. Scrub-jays showed a clear 
first-item effect on accuracy, but only minimal effects on 
latency. This suggests that the species used different cog-
nitive methods for representing the implicit stimulus se-
quence. Relational models predict effects on latency but 
not accuracy, the pattern shown by pinyon jays. Associa-
tive models predict effects on accuracy but not latency, 
the pattern shown by scrub-jays. 
This conclusion is given added weight by the species 
differences in acquisition during experiment 1. When an 
associative representation is being established, the change 
in associative strength produced by each trial tends to 
be small. Accurate sequential categorization using an as-
sociative mechanism may, therefore, require prolonged 
experience with individual pairs. In contrast, when a re-
lational representation is constructed, the results of in-
dividual trials are inserted into a pre-existing structure, 
potentially requiring a smaller number of trials to attain 
competent performance. That pinyon jays learned the 
original set of dyadic discriminations with fewer errors 
and reached a higher asymptotic level of performance is, 
thus, consistent with the interpretation that the two spe-
cies were using different cognitive mechanisms.
This finding is open to further exploration through ad-
ditional experiments testing for species differences in list 
linkage. Treichler & van Tilburg (1996) trained macaques 
on two separate transitive series (e.g. A > B, B > C, C > D, 
D > E versus F > G, G > H, H > I, I > J), then linked the 
two series together by training the last item of the first se-
ries with the first item of the second (E > F or J > A). The 
monkeys were subsequently able to choose accurately be-
tween pairs drawn from across the two lists. Our inter-
pretation of the results of experiment 2 predicts that pin-
yon jays would show much greater between-list accuracy 
in such an experiment than would scrub-jays.
General Discussion
The results of both experiments are fully consistent with 
the social complexity hypothesis. Pinyon jays learned 
multiple dyadic relationships that defined an implicit or-
dinal sequence more rapidly than scrub-jays and attained 
higher asymptotic levels of choice accuracy. They also ap-
peared to use a more sophisticated cognitive representa-
tion of the sequence, one that was less vulnerable to er-
ror. Because pinyon jays live in very large, stable social 
groups, their ability to infer the dominance status of other 
individuals is critically dependent on being able to make 
Figure 6. Mean response time of pinyon jays (●) and scrub-jays (▲) 
during transitive inference testing, analyzed for first-item effects. (a) Re-
sponse time across subjects within species is plotted for adjacent stimuli 
in which the rank of the higher-ranked member of the pair decreases 
from left to right along the abscissa. (b) Response time across subjects 
is similarly plotted for probe trials two steps apart. In each case, error 
bars bracket the pooled within-subjects standard error estimate for 
each species. 
Figure 5. Performance accuracy of pinyon jays (●) and scrub-jays (▲) 
during transitive inference testing, analyzed for first-item effects. (a) 
Mean accuracy across subjects within species is plotted for adjacent 
stimuli in which the rank of the higher-ranked member of the pair de-
creases from left to right along the abscissa. (b) Mean accuracy across 
subjects is similarly plotted for probe trials two steps apart. In each case, 
error bars bracket the pooled within-subjects standard error estimate 
for each species. 
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accurate transitive inferences. Social complexity thus en-
tails a predisposition to interpret dyadic contrasts as di-
rect evidence of an underlying ordinal sequence, a linear 
representation of stimulus relationships that facilitates 
tracking a large number of dyads simultaneously and in-
creases the accuracy of inferences about the relationship 
between novel items. Less social species, such as scrub-
jays, can also make transitive inferences, but their capa-
bilities are more limited, since they have not been subject 
to the same regimen of directional selection (Delius & 
Siemann 1998). Relatively nonsocial animals may require 
more extensive training, and the resulting cognitive struc-
ture produces less accurate transitive inferences, particu-
larly in the later portions of the sequence. The ontogeny 
of these cognitive structures would certainly be well 
worth exploring. Pinyon jays mature in a more complex 
social environment than scrub-jays, and the concomitant 
experiential differences may contribute to the observed 
species differences in transitive inference in adult birds. 
Tests with hand-raised birds could be used to address 
this issue.
The primate literature provides tentative support for 
our inference of an association between the mechanism 
of transitive inference and social complexity. Monkeys 
that live in structured, long-lasting social groups, such as 
rhesus macaques (Treichler & van Tilburg 1996; Chen et 
al. 1997) or capuchins (D’Amato & Columbo 1990) show 
strong evidence of relational representation, including ex-
plicit encoding of ordinal position and high accuracy in 
transitive inference across linked lists. In contrast, squir-
rel monkeys, Saimiri sciureus (Robinson & Janson 1987) 
commonly live in large, fluid aggregations with little 
fixed structure, and their transitive inference performance 
is far less impressive and more suggestive of associative 
encoding (McGonigle & Chalmers 1992; Harris & McGo-
nigle 1994). The pattern of cognitive differences between 
pinyon and scrub-jays may represent a more widespread 
phenomenon than has previously been appreciated.
Because any given pair of species always differ along 
more than one dimension, however, there are tenable al-
ternative interpretations of the evolutionary significance 
of the differences we observed. For example, several au-
thors have suggested that relational representation may 
be tied to spatial perception (D’Amato 1991; Davis 1992; 
Terrace & McGonigle 1994), and there is evidence that 
training rats with stimulus pairs in an invariant spatial 
arrangement increases the probability of subsequent tran-
sitive choices (Roberts & Phelps 1994). Pinyon jays cache 
large quantities of pine seeds during the late summer and 
autumn for retrieval throughout the winter (Marzluff & 
Balda 1992). Like other caching species, pinyon jays have 
performed better on open-room tests of spatial cognition 
than scrub-jays, which cache relatively little (Balda & Ka-
mil 1989; Kamil et al. 1994). This suggests that the superior 
performance of pinyon jays in these experiments could be 
a reflection of the need to recall and evaluate locations of 
dispersed food caches rather than a consequence of the 
demands of social living.
These alternative hypotheses can be differentiated by 
further comparative research, as they make contrasting 
predictions about other species pairs. This is an example 
of how comparative studies of behavioral evolution are 
most powerful when used iteratively, applying similar 
experimental techniques to multiple sets of carefully se-
lected, related species (Felsenstein 1985; Endler 1986; Ka-
mil 1988).
To test the social complexity hypothesis directly 
against the alternative spatial hypothesis, for example, 
one could compare Clark’s nutcrackers, Nucifraga columbi-
ana, and European jackdaws, Corvus monedula, two related 
Old World corvids. The jackdaws are highly social, while 
nutcrackers are relatively solitary, but in this case the spa-
tial cognition difference is reversed: solitary nutcrackers 
make extensive use of caching and spatial memory (Balda 
& Kamil 1989; Kamil et al. 1994; Olson et al. 1995), while 
social jackdaws apparently do not cache at all (Simmons 
1968; Henty 1975).
The inferior performance of scrub-jays on this task 
also opens the question of possible compensatory abili-
ties in other spheres. Are there cognitive tasks for which 
we would predict that scrub-jays might actually do bet-
ter than their more social counterparts? One possibility 
derives from the fact that scrub-jays have a considerably 
broader niche than pinyon jays, occurring in oak wood-
lands and savannahs, as well as in pinyon–juniper forest 
(Bardwell et al. 2001). They also accept a broader range of 
foodstuffs, including more food of animal origin (Madge 
& Burn 1994). We might, thus, predict that scrub-jays 
would show superiority in cognitive tests related to eco-
logical generality, such as exploratory behavior (Haemig 
1989), environmental sampling (Shettleworth et al. 1988), 
or neophobia (Greenberg 1984, 1990). Clayton’s (Clayton 
et al. 2001; Griffiths & Clayton 2001) studies of episodic 
memory in scrub-jays also suggest that their generalist 
ecology may require them to encode more information 
about particular food-related events than a specialist spe-
cies such as a pinyon jay or nutcracker.
The evolutionary origin of human intellectual capa-
bilities is one of the most challenging issues in behavioral 
biology. Often, the question is treated as one that can be 
approached only through observational studies of higher 
primates. But some of the factors leading to the evolution 
of human intelligence must be general, having effects on 
the cognitive abilities and organization of other vertebrate 
species. The experiments and results reported here dem-
onstrate the possibility of testing hypotheses about the 
evolution of intellectual abilities with nonprimate species.
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